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ABSTRACT
This paper presents calculations of the impacts of two levels of
mortgage revenue bonds (MRBs) on: (1) yields on home mortgages, tax—exempt
bonds and taxable bonds, (2) the allocation of the American fixed capital
stock among residential (by three tax brackets), business, and state and
local capital, (3) the productivity of this aggregate stock, and (4) the
federal deficit. The levels of MRBs analyzed are $40 billion and the maxi-
mum permitted by the realities of the market place. The latter is estimated
to be $440 billion or over half of regular home mortgages outstanding.
Limited levels of MRBs directed solely at "lower" income housing would
not have any clear impact on productivity. An unlimited volume would generate
an estimated annual productivity loss of $3 billion. Assuming a 4 percent
discount rate, the present value of this stream is $75 billion.
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Many issues have been raised in the current debate regarding the merits
of tax-exempt mortgage revenue bonds. There has been some worry about the
Impacts of these bonds on profits of investment bankers (positive) and
mortgage lenders (negative) and much concern over the impacts on the federal
deficit and the state and local borrowing rate (both rise))J However, the
most important economic issue --theeffect on the allocation and produc-
tivity of the American nonfinancial capital stock --hasyet to be addressed.
This is the most important issue because a productivity loss (or gain) is a
net loss (or gain) to society, and unlimited issues of mortgage revenue bonds
could generate a significant loss. In contrast, changes in profits, interest
rates, and tax receipts are a wash; some economic units/sectors gain while
others lose. Moreover, the net redistributions are likely to be small. For
example, higher income households would likely gain the most from a rise in
yields on municipal securities, but they would also bear the heaviest burden
of Increases In tax rates needed to offset potential shortfalls in Treasury
tax receipts.
*This research is funded by the Office of Policy Development and Research of
the Department of HUD through contract H-2893 extended to the Urban Institute.
Numerous helpful suggestions were offered by Harvey Galper and others in the
Office of Tax Analysis, Department of Treasury, at a seminar presented there.
iGeneral discussionsare contained in the Congressional Budget Office (1979),
Thygerson, Melton and Parliment (1978), and Tuccillo and Weicher (1979).
Kormendi and Nagle (1979) restrict themselves to estimates of lost Treasury
tax revenues.-2-
Under current American tax law, overinvestment in owner-occupied housing
relative to business, especially corporate, capital would exist even in the
absence of inflation. This follows from the failure to tax imputed rental
Income from owner-occupied housing and the double taxation of income from
corporate capital. As a result, the investment hurdle rate or user cost of
capital is lower for housing than for other private capital goods; resources
are invested in housing earning a lower rate of return than is available on
potential investments In business capital. Inflation aggravates this dis-
tortion because real after-tax debt rates decline and housing is much more
heavily debt-financed than is business capital.?! A recent estimate of the
annual productivity or efficiency loss from this distortion is $12 billion
[Hendershott and Hu (1980)]. Substantial usage of tax-exempt mortgage revenue
bond financing would increase this loss by causing a further substitution of
less productive housing for more productive business (and state and local)
capital. The substitution follows from the subsidization of the cost of
home mortgage financing and an increase in the borrowing rates of businesses
and state and local governments.
Thisbrief discussion also suggests that the channels through which mort-
gage revenue bonds affect the federal deficit need to be widened. The sub-
stitution ofhousing, the income from which is not taxed and the financing
costs of which are tax deductible, for either business capital, the income
from which is taxed, orstate and local capital, the financing of which is
notdeductible, will clearly reduce tax revenues. Also, an increase in taxable
bond rates will raise the cost of financing the federal debt. Neither of these
effects have been considered in earlier analysis.
2JThe primary cause of the decline in real after-tax debt yields is another
distortion in the tax law: the use of historical cost accounting in the
valuation of depreciatioii and inventory expenses tHendershott (1979)].-3-
Thepresent paper will provide estimates of the productivity loss and
increase in federal deficit caused by the growth intax-exempt mortgage revenue
bonds (MiBs). Two alternative levels of MRBs are considered:a legislatively
constrained (to provide only lower income housing) volume of $1O billionand
an unconstrained (except for the realities of the market place) volume. The
former is five percent of the roughly $800 billion late-1979 stock of home
mortgages outstanding and is one of the limitations being considered by Congress.
The latter is the volume of MRBs which raises the tax-exempt yield to thepoint
that it is no longer possible to offer MRB-financed homemortgages at yields
below those generally available in the market place.
The analysis of these two volumes of' MRBsencompasses three tasks:
(1) Determination of the impact on the financial markets. Of'particular
interest are the effects on the yields on tax-exemptsecurities, home mortgages,
and other taxable securities, but the changes in sectoral balancesheets are
also needed to obtain a full picture of the workings ofMRBs and to compute
the impact on the federal deficit.
(2) An assessment of the impact of changes in capital market rateson
the user costs of capital or investment hurdle rates forowner-occupied housing
and other components of nonfinancial capital and thuson the composition of
the nonfinancial capital stock. The impact of the latterchange on the pro-
ductivity of the American economy can then be calculated.
(3)Ameasure of'theimpact of financial market changes and the reallo-
cation of thenonfinancial capital stock on the federal budget.Treasury tax
receiptswill be lowered by the substitution of tax-exempt fortaxable financing, by
the simultaneous issue of mortgages and purchase oftax-exempts, and byIf
increases in owner-occupied housing at the expense of business andstate
and local capital. Treasury interest payments will vary with changes in
Treasury borrowing rates.
Theimpacts of MRBs on the financial markets and real capital allocation
are obviously simultaneously determined, and this determination is developed
in the appendix. The bodyof the text Is devoted to explaining andsummarizing
the nature of the impacts. Those on interest rates and the allocation and
productivity of the capital stock are considered in Sections I and II, respec-
tively. The impact on the federal budget is deduced in Section III where
changes in the full sectoral balance sheets are also presented. A concluding
section summarizes the findings.
I. Impact on Interest Rates
Table 1 presents hypothetical yields on long-term tax-exempt, corporate
and home mortgage securities under various assumptions regarding the level
of mortgage revenue bonds (MRB8). Relationships (ratios or spreads) between
the yields are also shown. The yields listed in the first row approximate
1979 (pre October) values. The second rowcontainslikelyyieldsunder the
assumption of a significant, but legislatively constrained, volume of IvIRBs.
The last row illustrates a pattern of yields that might exist when the only
constraints on ?.flBs are the realities of the market place.
Therelationships amongyields in 1979 are abnormal relative to historical

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































is low (the "normal" ratio during the past decade was about 0.7), and the
spread between conventional mortgage rates and yields on corporate bonds
(column 6) is high (the spread during the past decade has averaged about a
quarter percentage point). The low ratio of exempt to taxable yields canbe
attributed to the extraordinary purchases of tax exempts by commercial banks
and property insurance companies in recent years. The annual rate of net
purchases by banks in the 1977-mid 79 period is greater than all but the
1970-71years,and purchases by property insurers In 1977-mid79are more
than double therate of accumulation in any prior year. These demandscan
be attributed to the high and rising profits of these institutions see
Hendershott and Koch (1980)]. The large spread between mortgage and bond
rates is likely due to the extraordinary inflation-induced boom in the demand
for single-family housing rVillani (1978) and Hend.ershott and Hu (1979)],
which is largely financed by mortgage credit, and the absence of a plant and
equipment boom, which would be financed by issues of corporate bonds and
commercial mortgages. Put another way, mortgages currently contain a premium
necessary to cover the costs of issuing mortgage-backed bonds. Finally, note
that the subsidized mortgage rate (column 3) is 2 percentage points above the
yield on tax-exempt securities in the case of few MRBs, and 1 3/1,. percentage points
above this yield In the case of constrained and unconstrained MRBs. This spread
covers servicing fees, default insurance costs, administrative expenses, and
profits. As the volume of MRBs increases, the profit margin, and thus the spread,
Is likely to decline, but at some point a premium for these bonds mightberequired.
Other things being equal, MRB issues would certainly raise the tax-exempt
yield and the ratio of exempt to taxable yields. The increases in the tax-exempt
rate and the rate ratio are necessary to induce Investors to purchase the MRBs.-7-
As !4RB outstandings increase initially, households in lower tax brackets are
enticed to switch from taxables to exempts. At some point the rise in exempt
rates will be sufficient to induce (1) fully-taxed institutions (commercial
banks and property insurers) to purchase additional tax-exempts, (2) partially-
taxed institutions (thrifts and life insurance companies) to purchase exempts
for the first time, and (3) middle income households to increase significantly
the average loan-to-value ratio on their existing housing in order to finance
greater holdings of exempts.
TheImpact of increases in MRBs on the exempt rate, holding the taxable
bond rate constant at Rco, is illustrated in Figure 1.Allsections of the
demandcurve, except II, reflect the interest rate sensitivity of households.
Section II represents the normal demand by fully-taxed institutions, and.
section IV encompasses the additional demand of fully-taxed institutions and
the new demand by partially-taxed institutions in response to the rate ratio
rising above its historically observed level. Section VI is the demand by
tax-exempt institutions and households. The negatively-sloped supply schedules
reflect the response of state andlocalgovernment capital outlays to increases
intheir borrowing rate. Before the increase in MRBs, the exempt rate is Re
and the stock of exempts is EX°. An increase in MRBs raises the exempt rate
and outstandings, althoughthe latter increasesless than the rise in MRBs
owing to a reduction inregular taxexemptsoutstanding. An increase in the
taxablebond rate wouldshiftthe demand curve upward in Figure 1 and reinforce
both the rise in the exempt yield and the reduction in regulartax exempts.
A small increase in MRBswouldlikeLy not affect the conventional (unsub-
sidized) homemortgagerate, again holdingthetaxable bondrate constant.
The volumeof conventional financing would decline, but this could beaccom-
plished by a reduction in issues of mortgage-backed bonds and a slight










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































and toward taxablebonds. A large increase in MRBs, in contrast, would greatly
reduce conventionalfinancing and eliminate both issues of mortgage-backed
bonds and mortgageinvestments of discretionaryinvestors, leaving only thrifts
holding mortgages. Owing to tax-preferences, thrifts would be willing to
compete for this reduced demand for mortgage funds by lowering yields [Hendershott
(1978)]. As a result, the home mortgage rate would be expected to decline
relativeto the yields on taxable bonds. If the increase in MRB5were sufficient,
even thrifts would abandonthe conventional mortgage marketand only MRB financing
wouldexist.
Figure 2 illustrates the determination of the conventional home mortgage
rate. This rate is on the vertical axis and the volume of conventional (unsub-
sidized) home mortgage funds is on the horizontal. The demand forfundsslopes
downward,reflecting a greater demand to finance purchases of houses and other
goodsat lower mortgage rates. Segment I of the supply curve is the supply
by thrifts who will accept a net (of differential servicing costs) yield on
mortgagesbelow that on bonds due to the preferential tax treatmentafforded
mortgages;segment II is the normal demand where net yields are equal. These
solid schedules, which are drawn for a given taxable rate (Rco) and volume
of zs (MRB°), depict the market prior to the increase in MRBS; the con-
ventional rate is Rmor°, and the volume of nonsubsidized funds is NMOR°. The
initial yield on subsidized mortgages, Re +2,is also noted. The third
solid schedule indicates how the subsidized rate will rise, owing to both a
decline in the profit margin ()ofinvestment bankers and an increase in the
tax-exemptyield, as I4RBS expand and conventional financing is reduced.
With constrained issues of MRBs equal to )3C the demand for conventional
financing shiftsto the left (shift not shown) to a point suchas A, conven-




















































































































































































































































































to Re +1.75.Given thatthetaxable bond rate hasnotchanged, neither
doestheconventiona1 mortgage rate.
Next consider unlimited MBBs. Thedemandfor funds shifts to the left
(notshown) until either the subsidized mortgage rate equals the conventional
rate or conventional financing disappears (which would be true if the R#II
and supply of funds schedules did not intersect). If the taxable rate rises,
as seems likely, both the supply of funds and R schedules would shift
upward. The result mightthenbe a point like B, where conventional financing
is MORU, the mortgageratehas fallen relative to the taxable bond rate (only
thriftsarefinancing conventionalmortgages), andthe subsidized and con-
ventional mortgageratesareequal.
Thehypothetical interest rates presented in Table 1 and derived in the
appendix are consistent in all respects with this analysis. The tax-exempt
rate rises by a small amount(61basis points) with limited MRBs and a large
amount(209basis points) with unlimited MRBs. Thetaxablebond
rateisconstant with limited !'flBs,butrises by114 basis points with unlimited
MRBs. In the latter case, the subsidized mortgage rate, the exempt rate plus
1 3/b percentage points, equals the conventional mortgage rate, and the spread
between the latter and the taxable bond rate falls from 78 to 1.8 basis points.
II. The Allocation and Productivity of the Fixed Capital Stock
The observed net (of depreciation) investment hurdle rates or user costs
of capital in late 1978 for owner-occupied housing, business fixed capital
and state and local structures are listed in the first column of Table 2.















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































must promise toearn to be worth undertaking.Thehurdleratesare lower for
both owner-occupiedhousing, especially that of households in higher tax
brackets, and state and local structures than for business capital. The
hurdle rate for the former is low because of (1) the failure to tax the
imputed rental income from housing (while allowing the deduction of property
taxes and mortgage interest in the computation of the personal income tax
base) and (2) the decline in expected real after-tax mortgage rates in response
to increases in inflation. The deductibility of expenses also explains why
the hurdle rates decline as the tax bracket increases. Tax treatment also
explains the relatively low hurdle rate for state and local capital. Neither
the income (explicit or implicit) from this capital nor the property itself
is taxed, while the interest expense is low (is effectively "deductiblet')
owing to the exemption of interest earned on municipal securities from the
federal income tax.
The structure of current (1978) net investment hurdle rates is such
that business investment projects promising an expected return of 15 percent
are not being undertaken while housing and state and local structures expected
to earn less than 10 percent arebeing constructed. These data make it clear
that the efficiency of the fixed capital stock would be increased by lowering
the hurdle rate for business capital and raising it for owner-occupied housing,
especially for that of households in high tax brackets, and state and local
structures. While consumption of housing and local government services would
decline, productivity and thus real wages would increase sufficiently to
allow an even greater increase in the consumption of other goods and services.
The unlimited issuance of MRBs would lower the hurdle rate for housing of
householdsin alltax brackets and raise the rate for state and local and- i-
businesscapital. Thus the efficiency of the fixedcapitalstock would
almost certainly be reduced. Note, however, that limited issuance of MRBs
to finance low income housing only would not generate efficiency losses if
the housing came solely at the expense of state and local capital because
thenet user cost of the latter is lower than that of the former.
The stock of owner-occupied housing at the end of 1978 was roughly $114.50
billion.'Given that costs of capital vary by tax bracket,this stock must
bedistributed among households in different tax brackets. For purposes of
the calculations, two-thirds of the stock is assigned to those in the 30
percent bracket and one-sixth each to those in the 15 and 14.5 percent brackets.
These stocks and those of businesses and state and local governments are
listed in row (2) of Table 2.
Rows (3) and (1.4.) of Table 2 are estimates of the impact of constrained
and unconstrained increases in MRBs on the component capital stocks, and
rows (5) and (6) contain estimates of the average productivities or rates
of return earned (on capital increases) or foregone (on capital decreases).
The general procedure employed in these calculations is:(1) to deduce the
impact of the interest rate changes listed in Table 1 on the net and gross
user costs of' capital, (2) to compute the impact of changes in gross user
costs on the demands for capital, and (3) to average the initial and new
net user costs to obtain the average productivities. The details of the
calculations are provided in an appendix, but two of the key assumptions are
'The housing and businesscapitalstock data are current dollar net stocks
from Survey of Current Business, August 1979, pp. 62-63. The stock and
local capital data is the product of the real stock and price series from
the Federal Reserve Board's modeldatabank.-15-
worth emphasizing here. First, as is obvious from Table 2, there is no
change in the aggregate fixed capital stock, only a reallocation. Second,
the assumed elasticities of the demands for owner-occupied housing and busi-
ness capital with respect to their costs of capital is minus unity, while
that of state and local capital is -0.1. The former are roughly conslstentwith
empirical estimates; the latter is consistent with the widely held, view that state
and local capital is insensitive to financing costs (there are no reliable estimates).
In the case of a $11.0 increase in MRBs directed solely at lower income
households, housing of these households rises by $114 billion at the expense of state
and localcapital andhousing ofhigh incomehouseholds. The decline inthe latter
follows from the significant rise in yields on tax-exempt securities which
raisesthe opportunity cost of own-financing of high-income housing. These
offsettingcapital stock changes occur without any changein either the
taxablebond or conventional mortgage rates (these rate changes were con-
strained to be equal and happened to be zero).
With no constraints on MRBe, the volume increases by $432 billion which
constitutes an approximate 150 percent increase in outstanding tax exempt debt.
This volume of 14RBs is market-determined; the tax-exemptrate hasrisen su±'-
ficiently,giventhe decline in the conventionalmortgagerate, so that
municipalitiescanno longeroffer subsidized mortgagefundsat a rate below
thaton nonsubsidizedprivate funds.Thisincrease intax-exemptmortgage
financingleadsto a sharpreductioninthedemand for conventional mortgage
financingwhichlowers the unsUbsidized mortgagerateandraisesthe demand
forhousing by all households. The increase is less, proportionately, for
middle and high income households whose opportunity cost of own financing
rises sharply. The $35billionincrease in housing (2+ percent of the stock)-16-
isat the expense of both state and local and business capital (the taxable
bond rate rises by 111 basis points).
The change in the productivity or efficiency of the fixed capital stock
is simplythesumofthe products of average rates of return and capital.
stock changes:
PR0D =EX1, (1)
where bars denote the average of net user costs before and after the Increases
in MRBs and i varies over state and local structures, business capital, and
the three tax-bracket classes of owner-occupied housing. Multiplying rows
(3) and (5) in Table 2 and summing, a slight $0.07 billion dollar annual
productivity gain Is computed for limited MRBs directed solely at low-Income
households. Higher yielding low-income housing replaces lower yielding high-
income housing and state and local capital. The sum of the products of
rows (lij)and(6) indicates a $3.03 billion annual productivity loss from
unlimited MRBs. In this case, low yielding housing replaces higher yielding
business and state and local capital. A smaller productivity loss would occur
if the demand for state and local capital were more sensitive to its cost of
capital than was assumed, if the demand for housing were less sensitive, or
if the conventional mortgage rate did not fall as much relative to the taxable
V bondrate.
III. The Impact on Balance Sheets and the Federal Budget
An increase in the stock of MRBs effects the federal budget in three
ways. First, andmostobviously, investors will nowbeholding larger
quantitiesof tax-exempt securities and smaller quantities of taxable
'Toillustrate, if the elasticity of housing were 0.7 instead of 1.0 and the
conventional mortgage rate fell by 50 basis pointsratherthan 60 (relative tothe corporate bond rate), then the taxable bond rate would rise by only
1 basis points and the productivity loss would beonly $1.66 billion.-17-
securities.' This will result inreduced Treasury tax revenues. Second,
there will be more housing and less business and state and local capital.
Because the income from housing (imputed rent) is not taxed, but the financing
costs are deductible, this substitution would, at least In the case of unlim-
ited MRBs, lower tax revenues. Third, Treasury borrowing rates will rise
hand in hand with increases in corporate borrowing rates in the unlimited
MRB case.J This will Increase the interest expense of the Treasury. Thus
the federal deficit will tend to rise in response to all three of these effects.
Thepurpose of this section is to calculate the amount by which taxes would
have tobe raised to maintain an unchangedbudgetary position in thecases
of legislativelyconstrained and unconstrained MRBs.
The impact of expandingMRBs on interest rates and the allocation of
the nonfinancial capital stock has been deduced above. Inorder to calculate
theimpact on the federal deficit, we need to specify the full effect of
Increases in MRBs on sectoral balance sheets for four sectors: state and
local governments, nonfinancial businesses, households, and financial busi-
nesses. The top half of Table 3 presents the changes in balance sheets for
the case of constrained MRBS. State and local real capital is down by $6
billion [Table 2, row (3)1 in response to the rise In the exempt rate, and
regular tax-exempts are assumed to fallequally. Of the $1Obillion Increase
in MRBs, 85 percent is channelledintomortgages and 15 percent into taxable
securities(a reserve account). Owner-occupied housingincreasesto offset
'Thereare also changes in the taxable yields, but the impactofthese on
tax receipts are likely to be quite small because the changes are small
and the interest is deductible as well as subject to tax.
6—/For evidence to thiseffect, see Cook and Hendershott (1978).-18-
Table 3
TheImpactofMRBsonSectoral BalanceSheets


















Sources equal uses forallsectors.














































the decline in state and local capital. Roughly three-quarters of housing
is financed by mortgage issues ($1i billion) and one-fourth by liquidating
taxable securities. Given that holdings of exempts rise by the $34 billion
increase in net state and local supply ($liO -$6),the sectoral sources
equal-uses constraint dictates a $34 billion decline in holdings of taxable
bonds. Similarly,thechanges in the balance sheets of state and local
governments and households dictate the finance sectors' $28 billion increase
in holdings of taxable securities and decrease in mortgages.
The balance sheet changes induced by unconstrained issues of MRBs are
given in the lower half of Table 3. The increase in MRBs equals the increased
demands by households and financial institutions plus the reduced supply of
regular tax exempts. The institutional demand was assumed to be unchanged
above because the ratio of exempt to taxable bond yields (0.69) stayed within
thenormal historically observed range. With unconstrained MRBissueshowever,
the ratio rises to 0.835. Thisincreaseshould cause fully-taxed investors in
exempts,commercial bank and property insurers, to shield a larger portion of
theirincomewith investment in tax-exempts and partially-taxed financial
institutions, thrifts and life insurance companies, to invest in tax-exempts
for the first time IHendershott and Koch (1980)]. Fully-taxed institutions
areassumed to raise the portion of net income so shielded by 25 percent;
thus commercial banks will shield 75 percent of their income, up from 60
percent. This would raise the demand for tax-exempts by these institutions
by 25 percent or $115 billion at end-1978 values. Partially-taxed institutions
would be expected to invest 10 percent of their assets or $106 billion in
tax-exempts [Hendershott and Koch (1980)]. This gives a total increase in
institutional demand of $151 billion. Household demand Is assumed to rise-20-
by1250(Rex/Rcor) or $262 billion. The 1250coefficIentIs sharplyhigher
than wehave estimated in orderto reflect a hitherto unobserved demand by
middleincomehouseholdsImplicitly financed by sharply highermortgage debt.7
Givena reduced supply of regular tax-exempts of $19 billion [the decline in
state andlocal capital from Table3,row (1k)], the estimate of the increase
inMRBsIs$1132 billion.
Theremainingbalance sheet changes in the lower halfofTable 3are
calculated roughly as above. A major difference is a sharp increase in house-
hold mortgage debt as middle income households are assumed to raise their
existing mortgage debtby 15 percent of theirhousing stockto profitably
arbitrage between mortgage debt andtax-exempts.Thedecreasein business
capitalIs reflected in both debt and equity outstanding, and the reduction
in equity also appears on the asset side of the household balance sheet.
The change in Treasury net Income can be derived by applying tax rates
and yields to the balance sheet changesin Table 3and incorporating some
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The1250 coefficientIs still much lower than the 11800 (1978 wealth/0.7)
estimated by Kormendi andNagle(1979, Table II, p. 8).Thelatter seemn
implausiblylargebecause of the implied effect of the recent decline in
the rate ratio from 0.70 to 0.63 on household demand. The 14800coefficient
suggeststhat this demand wouldhave fallen by $336billion,ceteris paribus, orover Z4 times household holdings at the end of1978.While ceterisaribus Isobviously a strong assumption, other things seem unlikely to have shifted
thedemand function by over $300 billion. It would be interesting to see how
well the Kormendi-Nagle equation traces out household demand through 1979.-21-
The first line refers to changes in household tax payments owingtochanges
in financial asset holdings, while the second line reflects changes in
payments caused by changes in mortgage interest tax deductions owing to both
increased mortgage debt and the refinancing of existing mortgage debt at the
lower subsidized mortgage rate. Lines 3 and 14 refer to changes in tax payments
of nonfinancial and financial businesses, and line 5 is the decline in income
caused by greater Treasury credit market costs. All quantity items in the
equation refer to the balance sheet changes listed in Table 14, except DEBT
which is the level of outstanding federal debt not held by trust funds or the
Federal Reserve ($500 billion at the end of 1978). The initial corporate and
8
mortgage interest rate data are available in Table 1; other assumed values
are Requ° =0.12and Rcap° =0.11.The tax rate assumptions applicable to
both constrained and unconstrained MRBs are=0.214,¶b =0.14and i= 0.2.
For constrained MRBS, =0.35and 0.3; for unconstrained, =0.25
and=0.25.
The estimated changes In Treasury net income are listed in Table 1+.
Five sources of the changes are delineated: the substitution of exempt
securities for taxable securities In investors portfolios, the refinancing
of existing mortgages at the lower subsidized mortgage rate (which is an
offset to the increase in exempt securities), the increase in owner-occupied
housing (the Income from which is not taxed but the associated financing
charges, including foregone income on own-equity, are deductible), the decline
•WIn the constrained MRB case wherea]J the subsidized mortgages go to low
income households, both Rinor and Ra for these households are calculated
as averages of the initial and end subsidized mortgage rates (0.0788 and
0.0827 from Table 1). Further, all refinancing (M0RS-MoRh)isassumed
to be by these households. In the unconstrained case, refinancing is assumed
to be proportional to the mortgage debt of the different income classes.-22-
Table
Annual Change in Treasury Income to be Recovered
by TaxRateChanges (billions of $)
Source Constrained MRBs ($l10 bil) Unconstrained NRBs($L32 bil)
Substitution of Tax -1.25 -6.88
a] Exemptsfor Taxables-
Increase in Mortgage Debt' ÷0.11








Cost per $ofMRBs 0.026 0.029
Notes [all refer to equation (2)]:
!!Rows (1) and(1).
'Thefirst summation in row (2).
1The second summation in row (2).
'Row(3).
'Row(5).-23-
Inbusiness capital (the income from which is taxed buttheassociated financing
charges are only partially deductible), and the increase in the interest expense
on the federal debt. As can be seen, the impact on Treasury annual net income
would be significant, one billion per year, in the case of constrained MRBs
and enormous, $12.6 billion per year, with unconstrained MRBs. The only
surprising aspect of Table b is the positive impact on Treasury tax receipts
of the increase in housing in the case of limited MRBs. This follows from
(1) the assumption that all subsidized mortgages were channelled to low tax
bracket households and (2) the reduction in housing of higher tax bracket
households induced be the increase in the tax-exempt rate, theiropportunity
cost of own financing. Owing to their higher tax brackets and mortgage rates,
the decrease in the tax value of their interest deductions outweighs the
increased tax saving of low Income households. The lost revenue per billion
dollars of MRBs is quite similar in the two cases, between $25 and $30 million.
This is slightly above the $22- million estimate of the CBO (1979, pp. 117-51).
IV.Summary
Increasesin MRBs raise the tax-exempt yield which, ceteris paribus,
reduces the demands for state and local capital and housing of high income
households. The latter occurs because the tax-exempt yield is the opportunity
cost of own financing for these households. When only limited Increases in
MRBs are allowed and the funds raised are directed to low income households
only, the demand for housing by these households rises by as much as the sum
of the demands for housing by high income households and state and local
capital falls. There is no tendency for the unsubsidized home mortgage and
taxable bond ratesto change.There is also virtually no impactonaggregate-21 -
productivity;the net productivity gain owing to the increased housing roughly
equals the productivity loss from reduced state andlocalcapital. Finally,
the Impact on Treasury revenue is not complicated. There are the large,
well-understood lost tax receipts caused by the substitution of exempt debt
fortaxable debt in asset portfolios andasmall gain owing to the refinancing
of existingmortgage debt at the lower subsidized rates. The annual costis
$26 million per billion dollars of MRBs, and this cost is simply a transfer
of' funds from some economic units to others.
With no legislativeconstraints,MRBs would expand until the tax-exempt
yield rose so high that it would not beeconomically feasible to issue addi-
tional MRBs and relend the funds at a yield below what households could obtain
from conventional sources. This volume of MRBs is estimated to be about $4O
billion. MRBs of this volume would increase outstanding tax-exempt debt by l
times and replace half of regular home mortgage financing. Because all housing
is subsidized, the increase in housing demand exceeds the decline in the
demand for state and local capital. As a result the taxable bond rate rises
to choke of I plant and equipment demand. Thus, housing replaces business
and state and local capital, both of' which would have earned greater returns
than the housing. The estimated annual productivity loss is $3
billion. Assuming a real after-tax discount rate of 1 percent, the present
value of this loss is $75billion.This is, of course, a net loss to society.
The rise in the taxable bond rate results in two additional losses to the
Treasury; the cost of servicing the federal debt increases and tax receipts
on income from the foregone business capital are lost. However, these addi-
tional costs are only about $3 million per billion of MRBs. The $12.6 billion
total cost to the Treasury simpiy reflects the large volume of MRBs.
The large productivity loss constitutes a strong case for limiting MRB-25-
issues. However, it seems rather odd for the federal government to be making
such a case. After all, it is federal statutes that are largely responsible
for the enormous current differences ininvestment hurdle ratesshown in
Table 2. If the federal government is really concerned with productivity
losses, as well it should be, there are ample options available to it. For
example, cessation of the double taxation of corporate dividends and allowance
of replacement-cost depreciation would sharply lower the investment hurdle
rate for business capital, while limitations on the interest and property tax
deductions of households would raise housing hurdle rates for households in
higher tax brackets [Hendershott and Hu (1980)]. There is something unseemly
about the federal government restricting other governments from playing the
same"be goodto housing" game that it has perfected over the years and seems
so reluctant to give up, in spite of the mounting evidence of the long-run
damage being inflicted on the econcmy.
It is particularly paradoxical for Congress to be simultaneously con-
sidering a complete prohibition on mortgage revenue bonds and reactivation
of the below-market Tandem interest rate subsidies. Ourcalculations suggest
thatnolost productivity would occur with limited MRBs becausethe additional
housingpromises to earn as great a return as the state and local capital
being lost. In contrast, the Tandem mortgage purchase program, which finances
mortgage credit by issuingtaxable bonds, wouldraisetaxable rates and crowd
out business capital that is more productive than housing. Clearly tax-exempt
MRB financing is preferable to taxable bond financing.-26-
Appendix
This appendix presents the explicit model and assumptions underlying
the calculated changes in Interest rates and capital stocks reported In
Tables 1 and2.
A.Constrained MRBs
Ifthe relevant production functions for the economy are of the CES
form, then the demands for capital after increases in MRB8 can be related
to the initial demands and the ratios of the initial to new gross costs of
capital:
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where K1 refers to HOUS15, HOUS3, H0US5 (the subscript denoting the tax
bracket of the households holding the housing), P&E, and STR; the A and o
superscripts refer to after and before the Increase in MRBs, respectively;
the c's are net user costs of capital; and the d's are depreciation rates.
The exponent e Is assumed to be 1.0 for all K1 except STR; for STR, e =0.1.
This assumption is discussed briefly in the text.
The post lncrease-in-MRB net user costs are related to pre-increase
net user costs and changes in the interest rates:







Theinitial costs of capital reflect the ratio of the capital good price to
the general price level in late 1978 based upon a ratio of unity in 1961;..
Thus the change in interest rate terms are scaled by the same ratios (1.14
forhousing, 1.2 for business capital, and 1.25 for state and local structures).
For housing, weighted averages of changes in yields on debt and the opportunity
cost of own financing are employed. The debt rate is the after-tax mortgage
rate (0.85, 0.7 and 0.55 equal 1 minus the relevant marginal tax rate) and
the weight applied to the debt rate is 0.75 for low and medium income house-
holds and 0.9 for high income households. The own financing rate is the
corporatebond rate for low and mediumincome households, and the tax-exempt
rateforhigh income households. Theformofthe housingcostof capital
expressions andtheinitial values of the c0'a are given inHendershott and
Hu (1979a). The depreciation rate for housing is set at 0.025 which is
roughly 1.14(0.0175).
The changes in the costs of capital for business and state and local
capital are related entirely to changes in the relevant debt rate (the
equity rates are assumed to move with the relevant bond rates). The initial
businesscosts of capital areaverages of the net costs of capital for corporate
structures and equipmentreported in Hendershott andHu(1979b) less 0.015. The
constant is subtracted to account for the lower costs of capital for unincorporated
businesses caused by the fact that their equity returns are not taxed at both
the firmand personallevels. The depreciation rate is an average of the
depreciation rates for equipment andstructures adjustedfor the price ratio
factor: 0.102 =1.2[(0.l3+0.01;)].The initial net user cost of capital for-28-
state and local Structures is taken to be l.25(Rex +0.005).A nominal,
rather than real, rate of interest is employed because state and local
investment projects financed with revenue bonds must generate initial
revenues sufficient to meet nominal debt payments. The depreciation rate
is 0.05 1.25(0.014).
The $140 billion dollar increase in MRBs is assumed to be directed to
financing low income housing only. A maximumof$50 billion of the $2142
billion of low income housing is assumed to be eligible for this subsidized
financing. Thus H0U315 is divided into two components, HOUS
15s'
the initial
value of which is $50 billion, andHOUS1SU, the initial value of which is
$192 billion, with associated costs of capitalc155 andc15. The latter
are both still defined by equation (6),buttRmor forc15 isR# -Rmo?,where
=.f(Re+0.0175)+(Re+0.02)]. (11)
The three equations which can be thought of as determining the three
interest rates are
TI4 = (12)
Re=Re+0.002[ANRB-STR-EX] (13) Rcor Rcor
Bmor =Rcor.
(114)
The first says that the new and old aggregate fixed capital stocks are equal;
the second, an inverted household demand equation, specifies how the rate-ratio
must rise to induce households to absorb increases in tax-exempt securities
(EXf is zero, by assumption, in the limited MRS case), and the third ties the
change in the conventional mortgage rate to the change in the corporate bond rate.-29-
B. Unconstrained MRBs
Equations (i) through (10) continue to hold with the exception or (7).
When tax-exemptrates rise sharply,tax-exempts become more profitable than
taxablesfor investors in the 30 percenttax bracket and 90 percent financing
becomespreferable to 75percentfinancing. Thus equation (7)becomes
=c3
+l.14[0.9(O.7)Rmo+0.lRe-O.75(0.7)Rmo?-0.25(0.7)Rco?].(7a)
This same phenomenon suggeststhat the coefficient in the invested household
demand equation be lowered. The 0.002coefficient inequation(13) is reduced
to 0.0008 (see the discussion in note 6 on page 20). Further,EX in this
equation is now $151 billion (see page 19 in the text) and LMRB is endogenous.
MRBs will expand until the conventional and subsidized mortgage rates are
equal. Thus equation (ii) is replaced by
Rmo =Re+0.0175. (ha)
Owing to the sharp decline in the demand for conventional mortgage financing,
the conventional mortgage rate should decline vis-a-vis the taxable bond rate.
Thriftsareassumedto compete for the limited demand by passing the value
of theirtax preferences along to borrowers. This has been estimated to be
worth 60 basIs points tHendershott (1978)]. Thus
Rmo=Rco-0.006. (1Iia)-30-
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